Laws And Lawyers

Queen’s Bench Divisional Court
Published January 26, 2010
Syed v Director of Public Prosecutions
Before Mr Justice Collins and Mr Justice Silber
Judgment January 13, 2010
It was incumbent on police officers who were considering using force to enter and search premises, without a warrant, to establish first whether they had power to do so on account of some serious or dangerous incident having occurred. Police officers’ concern for the welfare of someone on the premises was not sufficient.
The Queen’s Bench Divisional Court so held when allowing an appeal by way of case stated by the defendant, Shaheed Syed, against his conviction by Oxford Justices on April 21, 2009, of assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty contrary to section 89(1) of the Police Act 1996.
In January 2009, three police officers had gone to an address having been informed by a member of the public that there were sounds of a disturbance there.
The defendant confirmed to the officers that he had had a verbal argument with his brother, who was inside. On further questioning he became evasive and tried to end the conversation.
The officers, although they had not seen evidence that any of the occupants who had come to the door had been harmed, or that any other person had caused or suffered injury, explained their power of entry and search for the purpose of “saving life or limb”, as authorised under section 17(1)(e) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and said that they intended to confirm the welfare of the defendant’s brother. The defendant struggled with the officers as he tried to prevent them entering.
Miss Lucy Tapper for Mr Syed; the prosecution did not appear.
MR JUSTICE COLLINS said that the test of “concern for the welfare” of someone within the premises, applied by the police in this case and accepted by the magistrates, was too low.
It was important to bear in mind that Parliament had set a high threshold in section 17(1)(e) of the 1984 Act because it was a serious matter for a citizen to have his house entered by the police against his will.
The expression “saving life or limb” was somewhat outmoded. However, it was plain that Parliament had intended that right of entry should be restricted to cases where the police apprehended that something of a serious nature had occurred or was likely to occur.
Although the defendant’s reaction might seem improper and different considerations might apply if the charge had simply been one of assault, the charge here was that of assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty.
On the facts, the magistrates could not have properly concluded that the police had been acting in the execution of their duty and the conviction could not stand.
MR JUSTICE SILBER agreed. As had been observed by Mr Justice Stamp in Bourne v Norwich Crematorium Ltd ([1967] 1 WLR 691, 696) it was important not to distort meaning by divorcing the words being construed from the words surrounding them.
The neighbouring words in section 17(1)(e) of the Act, “preventing serious damage to property”, supported the conclusion that a forced entry was lawful only if the police officer believed that life or limb was seriously endangered.
Solicitors: Reeds, Oxford.